I am a Ph.D. candidate at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona & Barcelona School of Economics under the supervision of Professor Pau Milán.
My research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Design and Industrial Organization. I am in the 2025-26 Job Market.
I visited Paris School of Economics hosted by Francis Bloch in the Springs of 2024 and 2025.
This paper explores how organizational structure influences the effectiveness of monitoring in firms, particularly under the threat of collusion between agents and monitors. Traditional models in contract theory often assume truthful reporting under high detection probabilities, overlooking complex collusion dynamics. Departing from this view, the paper proposes a novel firm design approach that allows the principal to assign two monitors to each agent and ties their compensation to the full set of reports, reducing collusion incentives. The model extends the principal supervisor agent framework to a continuum of agents with private productivity levels and considers how the number of monitors affects detection, costs, and incentive structures. It highlights trade-offs in monitoring intensity and shows how heterogeneity in detection likelihood can shape optimal monitoring schemes. I show that \textit{collusion risk reshapes the optimal organizational structure}. When collusion is a concern, the optimal design no longer minimizes redundancy —it leverages it as an anti-collusion device. These findings provide insights into monitoring and wage structures and explain industry-specific monitoring practices, offering a novel perspective on the design of organizational incentives.
This paper builds a theoretical model of communication and learning on a social media platform, and describes the algorithm an engagement-maximizing platform implements in equilibrium. This algorithm overexploits similarities between users, locking them in echo chambers. Moreover, learning vanishes as platform size grows large. As this is far from ideal, we explore alternatives. The reverse-chronological algorithm that social platforms reincorporated after the DSA was enacted turns out to be insufficient, so we construct the "breaking-echo-chambers" algorithm, which improves learning by promoting opposite viewpoints. Finally, we advocate for horizontal interoperability as a regulatory measure to align platform incentives with social welfare. By eliminating platform-specific network effects, interoperability incentivizes platforms to adopt algorithms that maximize user well-being.
I analyze a two-period model of political competition where voters care about candidates’ integrity. Candidates must trade off implementing their preferred policy against maintaining their electoral promises. Voters punish candidates that deviate from electoral promises by voting for their opponent. I find that punitive voting can exert political discipline only if candidates face low levels uncertainty about voters preferences. In this case candidates’ electoral promises are a compromise between their preferred policy and voters’ preferences, and when elected they implement their promise. Finally, I show that when one candidate’s ideal policy is closer to the median voter, an equilibrium exists where one candidate is disciplined and the other is not.
This paper investigates how competition shapes ideological slant in television news. While theoretical models suggest that increased media competition can either intensify or mitigate bias—depending on whether audiences seek confirmation or accuracy—empirical evidence remains limited. We address this gap by analyzing the entry of a new Spanish TV news outlet and measuring how it alters the political slant of existing providers. Our approach combines a formal model of political media markets with a novel empirical strategy that leverages large-language-model and text-analysis techniques. We disentangle media bias into topic selection, ideological tone, and airtime allocation—capturing the three primary channels through which slant manifests. Our findings offer the first direct evidence of how heightened rivalry influences not just audience composition, but the strategic editorial decisions that shape political coverage. Supported by a Google Cloud Research Grant.
M.Res. in Economic Analysis (IDEA) at UAB
Professor: Jordi Massó
Professor: Pau Milán
Professor: Pau Milán
M.Res. in Economic Analysis (IDEA) at UAB
Professor: Jordi Caballé
Email: manuel.lleonart@bse.eu
Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Edifici B
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona (Spain)