Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between identity and whistleblowing in relationships within organizations. My research explores the domain of whistleblowing, a vital mechanism for uncovering organizational misconduct, and investigates the impact of individual identity on the decision-making process of potential whistleblowers. While existing empirical studies have hinted at the potential influence of identity on whistleblowing behaviors, a comprehensive economic model that effectively explains the underlying trade-offs for whistleblowers remains scarce in the literature. By integrating economic theory with the concept of identity, I seek to provide a solid theoretical framework for understanding whistleblowing decisions. In the context of Principal-Agent theory, I explore how personal identities may interact with the incentives whistleblowers face, thereby influencing their choices to report or cover up organizational misdeeds.

Abstract: Social media platforms govern the exchange of information between users by providing personalized feeds. This paper shows that the pursuit of engagement maximization, driven by monetary incentives, results in low-quality communication and the proliferation of echo chambers. A monopolistic platform disregards social learning and curates feeds that primarily consist of content from like-minded individuals. We study the consequences on learning and welfare resulting from transitioning to this algorithm from the previously employed chronological feed. We show that the platform could create value by using its privileged information to design algorithms that balance learning and engagement, maximizing users’ welfare. However, incentivizing a monopolist to embrace such an approach presents challenges. To address this, we propose interoperability as a measure to overcome network effects in platform competition, level the playing field, and prompt platforms to adopt the socially optimal algorithm.

Abstract: Still nowadays TV channels remain the main source through which many people acquire information about the world. Understanding the underlying mechanisms behind editorial decisions is crucial for assesing and regulating media markets. In this paper, our aim is to delve into the ways in which TV channels can influence viewers' perspectives by strategically modifying the attention they given to the stories of the day. To accomplish this, we develop a theoretical model that explores how an informed sender (the TV channel) commits to a reporting strategy for every state of the world it might face in order to persuade an uninformed viewer towards its own ideology. To bridge the gap between our theoretical model and the empirical evidence, we collect a unique dataset encompassing the major Spanish TV channels. By leveraging machine learning techniques, we analyze how these channels discuss the same exact stories on a given day, varying their tone, position and time devoted to them. Furthermore, we establish connections between their content strategies, ideological affiliations, and significant events such as the Spanish elections, in order to gain insights into the dynamics of public opinion. By examining the interplay between media content and ideological pools, we can shed light on the mechanisms that shape opinion dynamics in society.

Acknowledgments: The project currently counts with the colaboration of Asociación Para la Investigación de los Medios de Comunicación (AIMC) and a Google Cloud Grant for Research.

Abstract: This paper explores the effect of reputation in electoral competition, where a voter considers the candidates’ perceived honesty and the proximity of their promises to their preferences. A two-period model of political competition is developed, where candidates face a trade-off between keeping their promises to maintain a good reputation or implementing their preferred policies. The efficacy of reputation as an enforcement mechanism is contingent upon the level of uncertainty candidates face about the voter’s preferences and the relationship between the salience of reputation and the weight placed on future election. The model demonstrates that when uncertainty is high, candidates prioritize winning the election and may break their promises, while for low levels of uncertainty and high reputation salience, candidates make compromises between their preferred policies and the voter’s ideal policy and implement their promises.